Greg Bahnsen On Logic, Science and Hermeneutics: The Inadequate Critique of Traditional VanTillianism Analytics

Greg Bahnsen, without hesitation, can be described as the most precise and prolific advocate of the doctrine of the late Cornelius VanTil usually dubbed "presuppositionalism." This post concerns itself with the analysis of the former in an essay entitled: Science, Scripture and Subjectivity: Is Biblical Interpretation "Scientific"? This piece also bears the alphanumeric designation "PA044" on the Covenant Media Foundation website page listed as "Free Articles."

Here, Dr. Bahnsen undertakes to show that the Positivist, Empricist, Evidentialist, Intuitionist, and other conceptual approaches to the sciences, and logical systems, do not amount to the kind of project these parties and others would have us believe. In short, he avers, these disciplines are not neutral, objective and invariant. He also intends to rescue the discipline of hermeneutics from the pitfalls of subjective judgment, retaining for it an honorific status as "scientific." He maintains that the sciences and logic are not so "objective," and the practice of hermeneutics not so "subjective," as we have repeatedly been told.

Here I will argue that Bahnsen's own critique (this one and others) implies a position regarding the sciences dubbed "theoretical instrumentalism" or else "theoretical antirealism," which he shuns at several points where he clearly implies this doctrine, pulling back at the last moment in silence to retain a kind of scientific realism which amounts to epistemological pragamatism. I also contend that this persistent oversight remains due to the fact that the presuppositionalist methodology of Dr. Cornelius VanTil has received lop-sided applications in popular theological literature, exploring rigourously its applications to philosophical questions, to other apologetic approaches, and to a few non-Christian religious systems (and then only in part), while awaiting such an exercise in comparative religions generally, the philosophy of the sciences, the philosophy of logic, and many theological questions likely to be raised in apologetic encounters with theological systems presently described by Christians as "cults" and the "occult."

It is these domains which I urge exploratory applications of Dr. VanTil's and Dr. Bahnsen's momentous insights. For our purposes here, I will argue that Bahnsen's critque falls short in precisely 3 ways:

First, his own reasons given against the positions he opposes suggest that he himself out to have reformed his philosophical approach to the study of the sciences in favor of a biblical form of theoretical instrumentalism (to avoid subjectivism), which he implicitly shuns.

Second, I will argue that he needed to draw important distinctions between the study of revelation and the study of the sciences, in order to retain the absolute epistemic priority of the Word of God over the sciences (which distinctions he failed to impose).

And, third, I contend that he left the reader with no certain philosophy of the precise relationship of biblical hermeneutics to the various sciences, which the Bible demands of us that we expound their both the defined borders of these two subjects (their proper limits), and their real-world interactions, both definitely and accurately.


Now to the stated purpose of Bahnsen's article we turn. Dr. Bahnsen writes that he categorically denies that, "a 'scientific' approach is (1) objective, (2) neutral, and (3) invariant. With it the arbitrariness, relativism, or scepticism threatened by subjectivity in a discipline can be countered."

The latter reference to "subjectivity" in his essay refers to the alleged overly-flexible handling of interpretive efforts, especially with regard to assigning meaning to the texts of the Bible. Here, Bahnsen challenges that the skeptics are too skeptical, just as they are too credulous when it comes to their allegiance to the sciences as the primary or exclusive source of objective knowledge about the natural world.

He continues his inroads against the oppositon in these words:

".... in answering the challenge that Biblical interpretation is unscientifically subjectivistic, we also have good motivation for critically questioning that conception of science which has been encountered above. We should see that science or theorizing in general cannot legitimately claim to be a fully and objectively justified enterprise, any more than it can credibly be seen as an example of unity." [Emph. added].

Here, Bahnsen takes excellent steps toward a fuller critique, but stops short of the inquiry's implicates, which he has begun.

Here I should like to add what he has implied. Since the various sciences cannot theoretically enjoin any kind of unity -- logical compatibility across disciplinary lines -- it is obvious that many of these successful theories are false. Otherwise irrationalism follows. This implies the right hand of arguments in favor of the bibical position: false theories can be useful for controlling the environment, for improving our standard of living, and for creating new innovations which can accomplish impressive feats and develop even new technologies in some cases. The truth-status of a theory is no guide to its utility, and vice-versa. These are independent attributes.

Second, Bahnsen has earnestly (and highly successfully) refuted the Pragmatist thesis, that success insures some form of identifiable veridicality by non-arbitrary means. This implies that the success of theoretical reason is no guarantee as to any other of its attributes. The most we might say is that greater utility equals greater profitablility in the economic markets. This correlation is well-established. But it hardly follows from "my theory made me a bunch of money" to "my theory refers to the real world accurately."

Third, "Theorizing is not a fully objective or justified enterprise" begs the question we must ask on behalf of Bahnsen. WHY is it not justified? He must -- to be consistent with his earlier critiques -- answer with the same objections given to the pragmatisms he has overcome earlier. To name but a few: it is not justified because it depends upon criteria which differ from field to field, for which there seems -- other than utility -- no objective basis (arbitrary criteriological considerations); judging a theory "true" based on its predictive power (or some other empirical feature) renders its truth-value time-conditioned. What is true today can become false tomorrow, when new evidence overthrows the old verdict. This has happened often in the history of science, and some have undertaken catalogs of them (i.e. Dr. Larry Laudan's Science and Values, etc); Third, since different fields of study employ different criteria, sometimes various criteria chosen make it impossible to distinguish between theory rivals. One might be simpler, and may explain a bit more of the present evidence well, while the other has great predictive power. This is the problem of mixed criterological comparisons (apples and oranges).

Let this suffice for now. Bahnsen continues:

"The common justification for science and its assumptions which concerns us now is that scientific inquiries as presently practiced are fruitful - solving important problems and enabling us to cope with the world. The indebtedness of modern proponents of this answer to Pierce and C. I. Lewis is rather obvious. With science we may better achieve our goals. The pragmatic answer rests, of course, upon the previous acceptance of a certain goal, and thus at this point we must not become intellectually lazy but press on and ask critically about the rationality or arbitrariness of that choice.

We can grant the superiority of science's problem-solving tools only after we are convinced that science is dealing with the right problems in the first place. So then, why should our goal be that of coping with the environment, instead of the alternative or perhaps more weighty aims of mystical union with nature, interpersonal rapport, appreciation of beauty, etc.? What justifies adherence to the particular goal chosen by empirical scientists? Perhaps that goal is simply arbitrary - consequently reintroducing relativism and scepticism."

Now this criticism properly applies the charge of arbitrariness to the question of operational VALUES in the sciences (i.e. how does one prove experimentally that we ought to big a bigger bridge, more fuel-economic car, etc.). Such values do not grow in a Petri dish. They are plainly imported from one's worldview into the practice of the sciences. Again, Dr. Bahnsen has presented an excellent point. But he could have converted this up-the-middle double into a base-clearing home run with a little additional pressure cooking.

One would have expected him -- given the title of his article -- to show that the criteriological values (we prefer theory X because it can predict stuff) -- not just the operational ones -- have no objective basis in theoretical constructions not deliberately tied to the empirical world. The same can be said for its methodological preferences, which differ from field to field as well. Why use microscopes of this kind, instead of those? Or some other instrument for the same job? Thomas Kuhn has also pointed out (and demonstrated) that instruments have built-in presuppositions as well (these are instrumental values), and one might ask after the objective reasons for those too, if any.

In short, this author could have deconstructed the entire party, but simply opted to upset the snack tray, and fire one of the caterers.

The odd part here is that Bahnsen has read all the requisite material to indicate that he knows this -- Thomas S. Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and several others -- and yet he balks at the clear implications of his own critique. The theoretical sciences have no warrant from scripture to theorize apart from the ideas and formulae suggested by empirical study anchored in observation and induction. And when they do this, they can still yield better paint guns, much to the glee of Orchard Supply Hardware customers the world over; but theories so derived remain -- here is the important word -- inherently -- retain an unknowable truth-status. We can only know their utility by observation, experimentation, and by trial and error.

Let the reader permit an important distinction. Men may lawfully theorize all they want this way or that, so long as they make no pretense whatever to have produced knowably true theories. The utility of any such consequent theories, and their results, has no bearing whatever on the truth-status of their constituent claims. This stems from the fact that such sciences employ (speculative) man-made and various criteriologies, standards (allegedly) of truth, when the truth has not multiple standards, but only one. Bahnsen has stated this repeatedly throughout his writings, citing Proverbs 20:10 and additional passages to buttress the point that "Differing weights and differing measures, both alike are an abomination to God."

The very multiple number of (and apparently arbitrary choices regarding) different tests in different fields, should suffice to demonstrate the antirealist thesis. And Bahnsen is easily astute enough to have caught this.

Multiple, logically incompatible standards (criteria sets) which pretend each to yield true theories, taken together, represents a form of epistemic pragmatism, a view so well rebuffed by Dr. Bahnsen's article entitled, "Pragmatism, Prejudice and Presuppositionalism" (to which he has alluded just above in his reference to C.S. Peirce and L. Wittgenstein), as to leave us wondering again at his truncated critique.

Theorizing apart from emprical anchors is not a realistic (truth-identifying) enterprise, wherein we may expect that the central features of its theoretical constructions point to real entities. Many are just placeholders, which pretend to name something "out there," when the number they dial has never been connected in the first place.

And if and when they actually do refer, we cannot say with determined accuracy. If you guess often enough, one might suppose eventually you will get something right (Even blind-folded dart games can still end in some points for each side, as well as a few badly injured cats).

This position, theoretical antirealism -- implied both by the holy Scripture, and by the persistent and many critiques of Dr. Bahnsen -- yet seem to elude him, just when we most expect him to speak up in its favor. Part of the problem consists in the fact that Dr. Bahnsen only seems interested in the epistemological question -- are these activities and procedures objectively based or are they arbitrary (subjective only). This overlooks the more interesting question, "Is anyone really home?" Regardless of whether these ideas are arbitrary or not, do they actually name entities that exist out there -- point to real objects? This is a metaphysical question, a question regarding what kind of things we have (or do not have) in this cosmos we have to navigate until we end our days under the sun.

The question of objective reference asks a metaphysical question rather than the sort Bahnsen seems most comfortable answering - or best trained to handle.

Dr. Bahnsen summarizes extremely well the controversial work of Thomas Kuhn, dubbed "the Structure of Scientific Revolutions," and yet sees the question still only in epistemological terms (perhaps this was as far as he wanted to go in this one article).

"Some recent philosophers of science have argued further that within a particular scientific discipline it is not possible to make a decisive choice between equally coherent alternatives as to methods and conclusions (see [Michael] Polanyi's Personal Knowledge and Hanson's Patterns of Discovery).

In particular Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions[22] goes beyond inter-field variance in science to establish the fact of intra-field variance as well; argumentation will differ from school to school within a particular field of science. To understand the working history of science, Kuhn speaks of incommensurable paradigms which espouse unique views on the basic issues of a field, offer a model for problem-solving, stipulate fixed points of conviction, and constitute a disciplinary-matrix of commitments to particular standards and methods.

When such a paradigm triumphs over its competitors within a field of science, it launches a period of "normal" scientific activity and investigation where series of problems are dealt with according to the pattern assumed by the paradigm. However when normal science runs into, not simply counter-examples, but disturbing anomalies which are sufficiently complex to render the paradigm unworkable or unsatisfactory, the subsequent tension within the field of study will stimulate renewed debate over basic epistemological questions and encourage random experimentation to be carried out.

Eventually, when the old paradigm is set aside - not without various non-rational means of resistance being utilized to preserve it - a revolution within the field takes place which may be likened to a gestalt switch, a new paradigm gaining ascendancy with its own standards of evidence, pattern for procedure, etc. Due to the reconstruction of its fundamental concepts and criteria, a reconstruction of the field of study itself is actually accomplished. Because competing paradigms are incompatible and weigh evidence or argumentation differently, the new paradigm does not succeed by direct verification; competitors argue with each other at cross currents until incidental and "non-scientific" factors influence a conversion to the new outlook, style, and methodology." [Emph. Added].

Bahnsen continues his Hume-like withering criticism on the alleged objectivity of logical systems, from the standpoint of one thorougly familiar with the most relevant epistemological features of the debates logicians are wont to have, one with another.

"Although the preceding discussion only suggests a program for cross-examining various alternative ways of justifying logical truths, it does give some reason to think that this issue is not an absolutely clear and certain matter in philosophy, and it does remind us that the approaches taken to the question are far from uniform. If the question cannot be clearly answered, we can well go on to ask, does the logician have a rational basis for his claims?" [Emph. Added]

While Bahnsen makes superior inroads against the Positivistic outlook which sees the sciences and various systems of logic and the mighty fortress of objective truth, and certain knowledge, a few added distinctions from the Christian world-view would have enabled him to resist the urge to think that any subjective edginess among the sciences and logics would somehow apply equally to the study of the holy Scripture. It is this subliminal equation -- if it is true of the sciences, it must also be true of the Bible -- that (I believe) finally cut short his critique, blunted what would have otherwise been the coup de grace to the old Enlightenment behemoth, that yet lumbers along in the popular mind, having long ago given up the substantial ghost.

Here are the distinctions we should like to add to Dr. Bahnsen's critical evaluaton. First, the Bible distinguishes between different kinds of methods in the sciences, giving a warrant to some (based on observation, trial, induction, repeatability and the like) while denying a like justification to others. Purely theoretical sciences construct -- they do not discover --the entities they investigate, building something like a rational puzzle -- a house of cards -- with logically connected parts, but which parts are completely disconnected to the real world.

There is no reason to think we have anything in these which will end up referring in the real world, since they did not have their origins here. But they can still -- because they reflect the rationality of the human mind -- find applications (sometimes very creative ones) which will in fact produce inventions or innovations destined to make our lives easier and (if one likes scientific puzzles) much more fun.

Second, the Bible has an utterly unique set of characteristics, which introduce to the world, a third category of information, called "revelation." Theories yield ideas about logical relationships between disparate data -- they can help us connect the dots. Observation yields a different sort of knowledge, we call "empirical" (meaning what we discover with our senses).

Now Mr. Kuhn offered the insight that all data are theory-laden. VanTil said something similar in arguing that no fact is neutral, but is formulated as a fact within a larger framework. Kuhn focused on different sized intellectual matrices like these, calling them "paradigms." VanTil focused on the most ultimate of these, calling this paradigm a 'world-view.' The Bible gives us information that is an exception to Kuhn's dictum. It is not the case that all knowlegde is theory-laden. All of it is "general revelation-laden." Now theorizing occurs within the context of revelation too.

But the knowledge we have in the Word of God is not theoretical. Theories can be wrong. God cannot. Theories come from the mind of man. Revelation comes from the mind of God. These two classes -- what God reveals and what man theorizes -- have mutually incompatible sets of attributes. One is eternal, the other temporal, and on it goes. This makes all the difference in the world in studying the Bible versus studying the natural world by way of theoretical constructing. Dr. Bahnsen nowhere notes this.

Again, God gives both his Holy Spirit to God's people, and gifts some with special insight, calling them to be pastors and teachers. This divine empowerment is not available to the secular scientist. He has only his natural gifts and perhaps a few good teachers. Now the Holy Spirit who speaks in the Word lives in God's people and the two are a perfect match. The sanctified reader is enabled by a power not his own to grasp the sense of the Spirit-inspired text.

By way of final important distinctions, the Bible -- though given through the media of many men -- for Holy men who spake of old wrote as they were carried along by the Holy Spirit -- have a unifiying underlying Source, so that the Bible is the very Word of the living God -- not the many theories collected together of a large group of scientists. This gives the Bible an inherent one-ness you cannot find with theories constructed in different places and times, by widely different kinds of people -- with no spiritual unity of personality undergirding the message conveyed in each theory, from this or that nation or century.

The consequent system of theology which arises from the necessary (theopnuestic) unity of the holy Scripture means that each true proposition of the Bible rightly understood does two things, and has one other important implicate:

1. It mutually and reciprocally affirms all other passages of the Bible rightly understood (the consent of all the parts)

2. It, by logical implication (carried far enough with the other passages), eliminates all other possible interpretations when carried out to its final conclusion. The truth tolerates no competition because God hates lies. This is by design.

3. The full final sufficiency of the written Word, combined with its inherently superhuman logical construction, means that it can do anything, so long as one continues to maintain only the proper (biblically justified) forms of reasoning when extending the biblical paradigm into new academic territory. The system can also be used to correct (by cross referencing the implicates of its various doctrines) any student who pays adequate attention.

In other words, the Word can overcome our sinful vicissitudes, and wavering assessments. Nothing is too hard for the Lord. We are not left guessing at any time, but can check our homework by the other parts of Scripture at any time, to ensure the proper results. This idea promotes the "logical sufficiency" of the Word of God as a necessary implicate of Jesus Christ as the Lord of wisdom and knowledge.

The Bible reproves -- corrects -- its interpreters, and so the Church can over time progressively gain greater and greater accuracy and insight not only into the theology of the Word, but all its many applications (perhaps infinite) to the natural world around us. The World is a very big place, and God's Word is sufficient to the dominion mandate. This would imply that the eternality of God's Word, combined with the reflection of God's eternal power and divine nature being seen from the creation would make for a never-ending, but increasingly glorious, task of learning to better control our environment to the glory of God and for the benefit of men.

Scientists, without the Word, have no objective basis to check their work. The charge of relativism (or better anti-realism) is therefore not reversible. These doctrines could receive elaboration at length, but these should suffice to show that had Dr. Bahnsen continued his analysis by careful scriptural assessment at each point of comparison here, he would have with greater boldness, rushed in where scientists cannot tread.

This means that Dr. Bahnsen's attempt to bestow the "honorific" title of "science" upon the systematic art of hermeneutics represents something of a misguided demotion. For it says, "without a doubt, the lesser is blessed of the greater." If one considers science an inherently realistic enterprise, he will wish to adopt a like name for hermeneutics. But if he reverses the polarity of this equation -- the systematic (but not scientific) study of the self-correcting revelation forms the bulwark and vanguard of Truth, to which the sciences must conform if they wish the blessing of truth-acquisition for an attribute, then the question can be seen in its proper and misguided light. Is hermeneutics scientific? I sure hope not, or we are in serious trouble if it must stoop that low for its right to declare authoritatively.

The very idea of the sciences having such a primary epistemic role necessarily subordinates the word of God to the words of men. But it is written, "You shall not put the Lord your God to the test" (not even a very scientific test).

These unique characteristics of the written Word begin -- but only begin -- to fill out it special nature as HOLY to the Lord. Is it not theoretical; it is not relativistic; it is not variant; and it most certainly is not neutral. The Bible does not convey science per se, but its implicates concerning knowledge, the nature of man and his mind, the true nature of the real world, its doctrines of God and the creation and fall, etc both provide the necessary preconditions for the intelligibility of the sciences and logic, but they also specify the true nature, scope and limits of each of these, setting the pattern for true knowledge in all things.

For all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hid in Christ.

The above begin to describe according to this revealed wisdom how VanTillians must modify their current paradigmatic understanding of the relationship between revelation and theory, between theories and facts, between the mind of God and the imaginations of men.

The Bible has the answer, and for one reason only. It actually IS the very Word of the living God. Handle with care.